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the level and the change of the prestige value of status goods affect the consumer’s utility level over
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1 INTRODUCTION
Striving for expressing and enhancing one’s social status is a determinant and a
continuous phenomenon in developed societies and economies nowadays. Its
manifestation is called status-seeking behaviour which has many forms, such as career
development and participating in certain events; however, only the consumption of status
goods as a type of relative consumption is considered in this paper.
Interpersonal effects play a critical role in the consumption of status goods
(Corneo and Jeanne, 1997a, 1997b; Kovács, 2015; Leibenstein, 1950), therefore, the
absolute level of consumption is not the only factor in influencing consumer utility. On
the one hand, an individual compares his purchased goods with others’ possessions2, and
in this way, his perceived relative position also has an effect on his utility level.
Furthermore, he can modify his consumption according to others’ consumption to
achieve a higher utility level and social status, whereas on the other hand, not only the
intrinsic value but also the prestige value of status goods has a considerable influence on
consumer utility. Frijters (1998) claims that the prestige value of goods is established by
the average status of the consumers. Thus, the prestige value changes during the lifecycle
of the goods, depending on the social position and the number of adaptors. The more
*
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individuals possess certain goods, the lower the status value of the goods. Consequently,
consumer utility derived from status goods should be investigated dynamically. It is worth
mentioning that status and prestige value regarding goods are used as synonyms in the
related literature. Thus, they are used as synonyms also in this paper.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the consumer’s utility level
derived from owning status goods changes over time due to factors related to the rivalry
for social status. An own developed model is presented, expressing the dynamics of the
consumption of status goods from the perspective of consumer utility. The core of the
model is how the level and the change of the prestige value of status goods affect the
consumer’s utility level over time. The model takes into consideration that present-biased
preferences (see O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) can be valid during the consumption of
status goods, as individuals are often impatient to achieve a higher social position. It also
includes that the prestige value of status goods changes during their diffusion, as the social
status and the number of adaptors (snobs and followers) vary, and that people have
different status properties when they purchase an additional status good to sustain or
enhance their social status. Moreover, the form of financing an additional (valuable and
durable) status good, which is with or without credit, can also influence the consumer’s
utility level. According to the model, the overall consumer utility levels per period are
determined for the whole considered period, and they can be applied to forecast or
monitor a proposed or an already realised purchase of an additional status good. In
addition, the model is also beneficial to compare various consumption alternatives,
including the different levels of influencing factors to predict and manage the utility levels
over the considered time period. The model can be useful to plan or forecast an intended
purchase of status goods by taking into account the individual’s financial position, to
avoid consumer’s or household’s indebtedness and to find the optimal form of financing
valuable and durable status goods for an individual.
It is worth pointing out that consumers tend to overspend on status goods in
developed economies3, the consequence of which can be indebtedness, as occurred during
the economic and financial crisis that started in 2008. Frank (2005) argues that when
people spend more on status goods due to a rivalry over their relative position, they
decrease consumer expenditure on non-positional goods; in this way, welfare loss occurs.
Bricker et al. (2014) point out that relative consumption has considerable macroeconomic
consequences, such as decreasing the savings rate and greater consumer indebtedness.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 includes a brief literature
review about consumption related to status-seeking behaviour. Section 3 presents a
dynamic model that describes how the overall consumer utility derived from status goods
is influenced by present-biased preferences, the level and the change of the prestige value
of status goods, the form of financing additional (valuable and durable) status goods, and
the passing of time. Finally, section 4 gives the summary and the concluding remarks.
3

If social status is important for an individual, he tends to invest a lot of money, time and energy to achieve
a higher position (Becker et al., 2005).
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Interpersonal effects arise at the level of preferences and not at the level of
demand (Iannaccone, 1989). The first works about status-seeking behaviour also confirm
that. According to Veblen’s (1899/1979) conspicuous consumption theory people often
strive to display their wealth to others by consuming conspicuous goods so that they can
achieve a higher position. In the rivalry for social standing individuals’ core drivers are the
invidious comparison or pecuniary emulation. The investigation of the demonstration
effect described by Duesenberry (1949) also reinforces that consumers’ preferences are
interdependent. Charness and Rabin (2002) identify the existence of competitive
preferences which have relevance during status-seeking behaviour.
Weiss and Fershtmann (1998, p. 802) define social status with a sociological
approach as “a ranking of individuals (or group of individuals) in a given society, based on
their traits, assets and actions.”4 Similarly, Ordabayeva and Chandon (2011) state that
social status is an individual’s relative position in a group that is not necessarily
observable. Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008) provide a core contribution to the related
literature as they point out the difference between cardinal and ordinal status. This is
relevant to the research and modelling in related topics and also to the interpretation and
application of research findings. Cardinal status reflects the distinction that exists between
the status goods possessed by an individual and others. However, ordinal status refers to a
consumer’s rank in the distribution of the possessed status goods. While Duesenberry
(1949) and Akerlof (1997) integrate the cardinal status into the consumer’s utility
function, Frank (1985) applies the perspective of the ordinal status in his model. It is
worth mentioning that Mazali and Rodrigues-Neto (2013) have a particular view of the
matter, especially compared to the ones mentioned above. They assume in their model
that an individual’s status is determined by the brand of the most valuable status goods he
consumes. I do not agree with this definition because one’s social position is established
by more than just one factor or possession. Consequently, a kind of average of their
features determines the status.
Some social status elements, i.e. the ones related to the family background, are
fixed in the short run (Becker et al., 2005). However, individuals can raise their status by
becoming a member of a certain group, investing in observable and valuable assets or
doing various activities (Weiss & Fershtmann, 1998). Status is also important for
individuals as it affects significantly how successful someone can be in non-market
situations (Cole et al., 1992) and it also reflects non-observable abilities (Rege, 2008).
A form of status-seeking behaviour is the consumption of status goods. A reason
for this is that status and consumption are complements (Becker et al., 2005). Rauscher
(1993) states that status goods reflect their owner’s social position, however, with a

4
Individuals rank members of society differently. Nevertheless, an individual’s social or relative position
can be determined relatively unambiguously.
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prospective approach, those are the “goods that an individual expects to increase his or
her status” (Kovács, 2015, p. 376). Thus, they can be regarded as ‘positional goods’
(Hirsch, 1976). The group of status goods is wide and varied. Not only tangible goods can
demonstrate the social position, but also the use of certain services and some forms of
free-time activities can do that. Therefore, studying in private universities, eating in
elegant restaurants and taking part in luxury holidays can reflect an individual’s social
standing. Furthermore, one subgroup of status goods is luxury goods with a very high
price as their core feature, usually reflecting in their appearance as well. Another subgroup
of status goods includes conspicuous goods that are consumed to display their owner’s
wealth to others (Veblen, 1899/1979).
Various types of motivation for consuming status goods have been broadly
scrutinised in the literature; based on the internal (e.g. hedonism, self-concept) and
external (e.g. exclusivity, social identity) drivers Eastman and Eastman (2015) develop a
conceptual model of status consumption. The consumption of status goods can be also
explained according to the social comparison theory described by social psychologist
Festinger (1954). The core of his theory is that individuals would like to assess themselves
accurately. Thus, they compare themselves with others, and then they evaluate themselves
based on the comparison. In line with this, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) argue that
individuals usually take into consideration others’ expected consumption decisions which
serve as a reference point before purchasing status goods. Thus, the consumption of status
goods has to be visible to others, which means that the consumption of status goods
satisfies not primarily basic needs but social needs (Chao and Schor, 1998).
Status-seeking behaviour through consumption is an everlasting form of rivalry
among individuals (Trigg, 2001). The main reason for this is the interdependence of
people’s social position. Thus, Immorlica et al. (2015) study status seeking activities in
social networks. Scitovsky (1976) explains that if an individual purchases a certain status
good as one of the innovators, his social status rises. However, the status of the individual
who has not adopted the good yet diminishes as a consequence. Thus, according to his
theory, status-seeking through consumption is a zero-sum game. Similarly, Bianchi (2007)
argues that consumers’ positional interactions reflect a kind of vertical rivalry among
them. The rivalry for social status occurs not only in the social elite but in all classes of
society, even though in various forms. Different goods can provide prestige for individuals
in various social classes. Possessing a yacht can contribute to belonging to the elite group,
while a used car owner or a person who can afford to go on holiday can be successful in
the rivalry in the poorest segments of society. Furthermore, there are many goods, such as
cars, houses or clothes, which are consumed in (almost) any social class. However, some
of their features reflecting the owner’s social status can be extremely different, e.g. the
brand, the age, the comfortability and the extras in case of cars; or the place, the condition
and the area in case of houses. Mason (1981) argues that both vertical and horizontal
rivalry can arise. There is a vertical emulation when individuals aim at getting a higher
social status by imitating the consumption patterns and the behaviour of the members of
the upper classes. In the case of horizontal rivalry, individuals in the same segment
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compete with each other. Trigg (2001) states that the social norms directing rivalry change
with the economy. In my opinion, the increase of purchasing power, the spirit of
consumer society, the relevant role of social networks and the enhanced social and
geographical mobility have a significant influence on the rivalry for social status
nowadays.
The aspiration for sustaining or enhancing one’s social status is present
continuously at both social and individual levels. Striving for maintaining and developing
the position is relevant for individuals not only because a more favourable or higher-thanbefore status is a utility-increasing factor, but also because as a result of consumption
externalities generated by others’ status-seeking behaviour, an individual’s relative
position can weaken besides the same or even the increasing consumption levels of status
goods. For an individual to sustain or enhance his social status, which is beneficial to him,
it is necessary (but not sufficient) to maintain or raise his relative consumption. Regarding
the dynamics of the consumption of status goods this means that at the same time an
individual does not become saturated by status goods due to their positional features.
However, their functional characteristics can cause saturation (as in the case of normal
goods). Thus, individuals can be highly innovative and fickle in the social status rivalry
when they choose intermediary assets, such as status goods or their features.
On the other hand, it is also important to realise that an individual’s relative
consumption can increase (even significantly) in such a way that his absolute
consumption level is unchangeable or rises only moderately. When others are forced to
decrease their absolute consumption level in consequence of increasingly unfavourable
economic conditions and to weaken personal financial position, an individual who has a
stable financial position and can finance (or even slightly increase) his earlier
consumption level of status goods can realise a more beneficial consumption than before
and can get into a more favourable relative position this way. These relations again reflect
that others’ consumption continuously influences the change of an individual’s social
status.
According to the reasoning mentioned above, it is clear that an individual gets
into a better relative position in consequence of others’ altered consumption decisions and
levels. However, in the following such a situation is pointed out when it is the individual
who is the originator and determiner of the outcome of his status-seeking behaviour. An
individual who is strongly motivated and involved in status-enhancing is able and willing
to take a risk to improve his relative position. It can be a financial risk if, for example, he
invests into a relatively expensive good compared to his income or wealth position (and,
for example, the consumption is covered by credit). However, besides the financial risk he
usually takes a social risk as well, since the individual’s status is exposed to a risk of not
being sure whether he can achieve the desired status through consumption or ownership
of status goods. Furthermore, there is a kind of psychological risk because an individual’s
self-concept and self-esteem can be influenced badly if it is confirmed that he ‘has taken
on too much’ by overspending to get the preferred good. To some extent, the three above
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mentioned types of risk arise during the consumption of all status goods. Thus, if an
individual purchases a status good that is not suitable for his real financial and social
standing, it can have several negative consequences for him and his status can even
diminish due to his inappropriate decisions. This could be seen during the economic crisis
that started in 2008, as several consumers became heavily indebted as a result of their
earlier status aspirations.
Bricker et al. (2014) emphasize that the relative income standing of households
affects the financial decisions related to the consumption of status goods considerably.
Households with a higher income level tend to contract a higher loan, become more
indebted or even choose more risky portfolios to finance their consumption in order to
sustain or enhance their social status.
However, a paradox situation arises when consumers become indebted due to
purchasing status goods. The purpose of status goods is to reflect or enhance the owner’s
social position, however, those who do not assess their property status or income standing
correctly and ‘take on too much’ by overspending due to their present-biased preferences,
cannot achieve their goals through consuming goods and end up in a relatively
disadvantageous social and a bad financial position.

3 THE MODEL
3.1 Framework and assumptions
The core of the model focuses on the dynamics of the consumption of status
goods from the viewpoint of the individual consumer’s utility. More precisely, how the
level and the change of the prestige value of status goods affect the consumer’s utility level
from the perspective of various time periods. In other words, the main point of the model
is that the prestige value of status goods changes over time and it has an effect on the
individual consumer’s utility. By applying a dynamic approach the model helps
understand how various alternatives of the consumption of status goods and their
influencing factors, such as the level of present-biased preferences, the prestige value and
the diffusion process of status goods, as well as the form for financing additional (valuable
and durable) status goods, affect the overall consumer’s utility level over time.
We imagine such situations where at time zero a consumer already has a certain
amount of status goods. This group of various status goods includes for example clothes,
accessories, smartphones, electronic appliances or cars and influences the owner’s social
status considerably. An individual purchases an additional status good to sustain or
enhance his social status. We assume that this status good is valuable and durable, for
example, it can be a house or a car. Thus, this good influences the consumer’s utility in the
long run not only in the period when it is purchased. We also assume that individual’s
preferences can be time-inconsistent.
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First, let us look at the initial consumer utility function. From the perspective
that goods can be classified into positional and non-positional goods (Frank, 1985; Hirsch,
1976), or in other words, status and normal goods (Mason, 1992), we claim that individual
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s consumer utility in period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 in a general form can be written as
where
•
•
•
•
•
•

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(1)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s consumer utility in period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the amount of status good 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 consumed by individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � is the (perceived5) status or prestige value of good 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 consumed by
individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in time period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, where 0 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � ≤ 167 ,
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � is the intrinsic value of status good 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 consumed by individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in time
period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, where 0 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �,
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the amount of normal good 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 consumed by individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � is the intrinsic value of normal good 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 consumed by individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in time
period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, where 0 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �.

We assume that individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 strives to maximise his consumer utility. As the model
focuses on how the consumer utility deriving from status goods varies due to the change
of the prestige value of status goods, which is a consequence of mainly individuals’
continuous status-seeking behaviour, interpersonal effects and the diffusion of status
goods, the intrinsic value of both status and normal goods is ignored from the consumer’s
utility function. Thus, in the following, the consumer’s utility function includes only the
factors related to status-seeking behaviour and the prestige value of status goods, further
their expense side.

A budget constraint is not included in the model. The consumption of status
goods is induced by the rivalry for social status considerably. Thus, the consumer utility
5

The perceived and not the real status or the prestige value is integrated into the consumer utility function,
since it is the prestige value perceived by an individual that directly influences his utility level and decisionmaking regarding status-seeking behaviour, and not the real prestige value which cannot usually be directly
realised or determined by an individual.
6
The status value of a good that is 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � reflects a relative value. The value of 1 means that the good has
reached its maximum prestige value, that is, the good is possessed by individuals with the highest social
status, meaning that only a few people possess it. A low status value demonstrates that the good is diffused
among consumers and most of the people who possess it have a relatively low social status. Thus, this
approach is consistent with Frijters’s (1998) view.
7
An additive relationship is assumed among the prestige value of the various goods, as each and every
status good can contribute to consumer utility separately. (Akerlof (1997) also integrates the variable of
status as an additive component into the indirect utility function in his status model.) There can be a
correlation between the prestige values of the goods in certain cases, such as a summer house and a sailing
boat. However, it would be difficult to handle the relationship between the status values in the utility
function from the applied approach, and it is actually not relevant regarding the core of the model
presented in this paper.
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derives primarily from the prestige value of the owned status goods and the possibility of
an individual to maintain or enhance his social status this way. As emotions, social needs
and emulation influence the consumption of status goods significantly, it cannot be
considered as a rational and optimal decision which is a core concept in traditional
consumer economics. This issue is studied from a behavioural perspective, and the budget
constraint is not included in this model.
Present-biased preferences can be valid in the case of status-seeking behaviour,
such as the consumption of status goods, which leads us to the belief that status is
considered as asset allocation to achieve future benefits and gain favourable relationships
(Geiger-Oneto, 2007; Lin, 1990, 1994). Thus, status rivalry in the society makes most of
the individuals impatient in the sense that they strive to achieve a desired or higher status
as soon as possible, or they advance the purchase of valuable and durable status goods to
enjoy and benefit from the status expression or enhancing. Consequently, time as an
influencing factor is also relevant regarding consumer utility.
As the model takes the possibility of present-biased preferences into
consideration, let us see how it is integrated into the consumer’s utility function. Based on
O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (1999 p. 106) point of view at time period 0, individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s
overall utility deriving from consumption is

that is,

where
•
•

•

𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 2 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢2 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 3 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢3 + ⋯ ,

(2)

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢0 + ∑∞
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is per-period consumer utility,
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 is time-consistent discount factor for long-run, where 0 < 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ≤ 1.
Its meaning and role are the same as the discount factor in simple standard
economic models during exponential discounting. Applying parameter 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 reflects
that the following utilities are weighted less heavily than the former levels of
utility. Thus, from today’s point of view the utility of 100 euros today is greater
than the utility of 100 euros tomorrow. Furthermore, an individual prefers 100
euros tomorrow to 100 euros the day after tomorrow.
Parameter 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 expresses “bias for the present”. If 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 = 1, preferences are timeconsistent and simple exponential discounting is needed. However, if 0 < 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 < 1,
present-biased preferences are reflected.
In the case of present-biased preferences, an individual prefers immediate
consumption and short-run benefits compared to later consumption and longrun benefits. Consequently, an individual places disproportionately higher weight
on present consumption than on any future ones (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).
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This actually reflects an individual being impatient. The lower the value of 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 is,
the more impatient the individual is. The impatience can arise due to visceral
factors (Loewenstein, 1996), self-control problems (Casari and Dragone, 2011) or
as a consequence of the change of the consumer’s reference point (Hoch and
Loewenstein, 1991). The impatience can be manifested in immediate
consumption when a new product or innovation is introduced into the market.
Another example is that individuals strive to purchase certain status goods as
soon as possible so that they do not lag behind in social status rivalry .
In the following sections, (2) and (3) as general forms of overall consumer utility
functions are applied to represent present-biased preferences in the model.

3.2 Case I: The status good is purchased without credit
Assuming that individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 owns 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 number of status goods in the initial time
period when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 0, let us look at the case in which an additional valuable and durable
status good, such as a car or a house, is purchased and consumed by individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. We
assume that individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 purchases this good, that is the status good 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 1, without credit
in period 1, in this way, the cost arises regarding this status good8 only in period 1. As the
good is valuable and durable, it has a status value not only in period 1 when it becomes
the consumer’s property but also in the subsequent periods or a longer run. However, the
status value of the good changes during its lifecycle, depending on primarily the number
and the social status of adaptors and the ratio of snob consumers and followers. Thus,
individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s consumer utility can be expressed for each time period in the following way
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(4)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(6)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(7)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + [𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 ) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 )]

8

(5)

The consumer’s utility function is extended by a cost factor as the model assumes the purchasing of a
valuable and durable status good where the related consumer expenditure can be considerable; thus, it
decreases the consumer’s utility level. It has relevance especially when a consumer buys a relatively
expensive good compared to its prestige value or his financial position. (The price as a feasible factor of
prestige value is assumed to be integrated into the status value of the good.) (In the literature on the
consumption of status goods there are some examples for that the consumer’s utility function is completed
by the price or cost factor, see Corneo and Jeanne (1999) and Frijters (1998).)
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where
•
•
•
•

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s consumer utility in period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the amount of status good 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 consumed by individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � is the (perceived) status or prestige value of good 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 consumed by
individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in time period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, where 0 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � ≤ 1 ,
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 ) is the price of status good 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 1 purchased by individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in period 1.

According to (2) and (3), further (4), (5), (6) and (7) from the perspective of
period 0,1,2 … 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s overall utility deriving from the consumption of status
goods in Case I is
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 =
∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽�∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + [𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 ) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 )]� + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 2 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + ⋯ +
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
�
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣
(8)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−1 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + [𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 ) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 )] + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + ⋯ + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � (9)
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−2 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + ⋯ + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �

(10)

𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � .

(11)

3.3 Case II: The status good is purchased on credit
Similarly to Case I, let us assume that individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 owns 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 number of status goods
when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 0 and purchases a valuable and durable status good in period 1. However, in
Case II we assume that the status good 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 1 is purchased on credit, consequently the cost
arises regarding this status good not only in period 1 but also in the subsequent periods.
The change of the status value of the good is taken into account while studying this case as
well. Thus, individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s consumer utility can be expressed for each time period in the
following way
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(12)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 )

(14)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + [𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 )]

(13)

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 )

(15)
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s consumer
utility inutility
periodin𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,period 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,
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3.4 The outcomes of Cases I and II with various alternatives
The purpose of this section is to study and analyse how the overall utility derived
from the consumption of status goods is influenced by present-biased preferences, the
changing prestige value of the goods which individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 already possesses in time period 0,
the level and the change of the prestige value of a valuable and durable status good
purchased in time period 1 and its cost. In the following, the overall utility derived from
the consumption of status goods is calculated according to the various possible values of
the influencing factors that reflect diverse consumption circumstances (Table 1). Thus, the
consumer’s utility levels can be compared over the period considered. Its purpose is to
investigate how the degree of impatience, the initial and the changing prestige values of
the already owned status goods, the financing (with or without credit) of an additional
status good, and the initial and changing prestige values of the purchased status good
influence the level and the change of consumer utility over time.
We can see four alternatives for 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 expressing “bias for the present”. If 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 = 1,
preferences are time-consistent. The other three values reflect present-biased preferences.
If 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 = 0.25, that is relatively low, the individual is very impatient, so he would like to get
certain goods as soon as possible. If 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 = 0.75, the individual is moderately impatient, but
he also prefers immediate consumption to the latter consumption. The value of 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 is not
relevant related to the core of the studied issue, and partly due to this it is unchangeable in
all alternatives. Besides the initial time period 0, there are ten periods. We assume that
individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 already possesses ten status goods when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 0. It reflects that everyone owns
at least some goods (e.g. clothes, electronic appliances) which, besides their functional
utility, also indicate one’s social position. There are four alternatives (a, b, c and d) for
∑10
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), which implies the owner’s financial position and social status in dynamic
approach. In the case of a the status values being summed up are the same in all time
periods, which reflects that while the status value of some goods increases over time,
others’ status value decreases at the same time, as they are in different phases of the
diffusion process. The overall value of 5 for a indicates an intermediate level regarding the
status value as according to (1) 0 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ≤ 1. In the case of b the status values being
summed up decreases with time as the goods diffuse among consumers due to the
bandwagon effect. Furthermore, as ∑10
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 8, this means that the consumer owns
goods with a relatively high prestige value, which leads us to the assumption that he’s in a
good financial position. Alternative c reflects a group of goods with a lower status value
and choice d indicates an even lower status value that can imply an individual’s bad
financial position.
In Case I the cost arises only when the status good is purchased. However, in
Case II (when the status good is purchased on credit) we assume an annuity with the
interest rate of 10%.
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Option z for 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+1 ) reflects a status good that reaches its maximum status
value when it is purchased, that is when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 1, so when only a few consumers with a high
social status possess it. Its diffusion process is relatively slow, especially if it is compared to
choice y. The values express the status value decreasing at a lower rate in the former and
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various status goods with the average prestige value being around the intermediate level in
the long run. At the same time, this reflects a stable social position. The sum of the status
values of the already owned goods being summed up is around the intermediate level over
the whole period considered. Furthermore, the individual has financial resources to
purchase an additional status good in time period 1, so credit is not needed. The good is at
the beginning of its lifecycle, which means that only a few consumers possess it. As the

v

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

0
0.4
0
0.3
0
0.2
0
0.1
0

0.3

0.0

70

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 21 | No. 1 | 2019

prestige value of the status good is high or at the maximum level when it is purchased, the
individual can strengthen his social position even more. The choice “ß=0.75, b, C=10, y”
provides the highest overall utility until 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 3, and the lowest one at the end of the period.
Comparing “ß=0.75, b, C=10, y” with choices “ß=0.75, a, C=10, y” and “ß=0.75, a, C=10,
x”, it can be stated that the already owned goods with a constant intermediate sum of the
values yield higher overall utility beyond 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 4 in all periods. Similar remarks can be
concluded when comparing “ß=0.25, b, C=10, x” and “ß=0.25, b, C=10, z” with “ß=0.25, a,
C=10, z”. The latter one provides a lower overall utility before 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 5 than the other two
alternatives; moreover, it exceeds them in the second part of the considered period. It is
also worth mentioning that “ß=0.75, b, C=10, y” creates a higher overall utility than
“ß=0.25, a, C=10, z” until = 8 , but the latter exceeds the former one in the last two
periods. In other words, a less impatient individual with a decreasing status value of his
property who purchases a status good with the maximum prestige value with a normal
decreasing rate realizes a higher overall utility until 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 8 than an impatient individual
who has goods with a constant intermediate sum of the prestige values and the
additionally purchased good loses its prestige value with a low rate.
Figure 1: Six alternatives with a or b when the additional status good is purchased without
credit
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Figure 2 presents alternatives where the already owned group of status goods
provides lower prestige in the initial period than the alternatives studied in Figure 1. Thus, the
individual is in a lower social position in time period 0. He is in a worse financial position,
since credit is required to purchase an additional status good to enhance his social status. If an
individual purchases the status good at the beginning of its lifecycle, he can strengthen his
social position much better. The alternative “ß=0.25, c, c=1,1, z” describes a relatively impatient
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Figure 2: Six alternatives with c or d when the additional status good is purchased on credit
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purchases an additional status good at the very beginning of its lifecycle provides a lower
overall utility in every period except the last one. Thus, it is the manifestation of present-biased
preferences that causes the lower utility level here. When 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 2, there are two alternative pairs
which provide almost the same overall utility level, “ß=0.5, a, C=10, y” and “ß=1, c, C=10, z”,
further “ß=0.25, b, C=10, x” and “ß=0.75, c, C=10, x”. However, the difference of the overall
utility levels increases in the following periods and becomes considerable when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 10.
Nevertheless, this means that diverse choices with various levels of the factors can establish the
same level of the overall utility directly after purchasing the additional status good due to the
trade-offs, the overall utility of the alternatives decreases variously in the latter periods because
of the different lifecycles and diffusion rates of the goods and the various degrees of impatience.
Both the slope and the intersection of the lines of the alternatives have relevance in
Figure 3. The choice “ß=0.25, a, C=10, v” provides the lowest overall utility until 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 3.
However, since its line is the least steep due to the low diffusion rate of the additional good, this
can provide one of the highest utility levels in the last period. Furthermore, it intersects
“ß=0.75, c, C=10, x” when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 4, so the less impatient consumer having status goods with
initially a moderate and later decreasing prestige value realises lower and lower overall utility
with an increasing rate as he purchases a status good at the beginning of its lifecycle. Similarly,
the overall utility of “ß=1, c, C=10, z” is lower than “ß=0.25, a, C=10, v” from 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 5, which
reflects the effect of trade-offs between the influencing factors on the utility level again.
Figure 3: Six more different alternatives when the additional status good is purchased without
credit
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The alternatives outlined in Figure 4 are different from the choices in Figure 3
where the additional status good is purchased on credit. According to Figure 4, similar
relations can be observed as in Figure 3. Moreover, the overall utility level of “ß=0.5, a,
c=1.1, y”, “ß=0.25, b, c=1.1, x” and “ß=0.75, c, c=1.1, x” is nearly equal when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 0.

KÁRMEN KOVÁCS | A DYNAMIC MODEL FOR INVESTIGATING CONSUMER UTILITY DERIVED

73

However, over time the difference between the overall utility levels increases due to the
diverse effects of the influencing factors. Thus, it is worth anticipating the overall utility
levels for the subsequent periods. Especially because “ß=0.75, c, c=1.1, x” provides a
negative utility level from 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 8, which reflects that purchasing a status good at the
beginning of its lifecycle is an excessive burden for the consumer compared to his
financial position. It is also valid for “ß=1, c, c=1.1, z”, where the preferences are timeconsistent the diffusion process of the additional status good is relatively slow, with an
intermediate prestige value at the end of the considered period. Furthermore, the line of
“ß=0.25, a, c=1.1, v” indicates low volatility and, on the other hand, this choice assures an
intermediate but compared to the others a relatively high overall utility level in the second
part of the considered period. In this way, an impatient consumer who possesses goods
with the intermediate overall status value and purchases an additional status good in its
maturity stage can realise only low overall utility in the first periods compared to others
but can enjoy a relatively good position in the second part of the considered period.
Figure 4: Six more different alternatives when the additional status good is purchased on credit

20

Consumer utility level

15

ß=0.25, b, c=1,1, x
ß=0.5, b, c=1,1, v

10

ß=1, c, c=1,1, z
ß=0.75, c, c=1,1, x

5

ß=0.5, a, c=1,1, y
ß=0.25, a, c=1,1, v

0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 t

-5
Figure 5 illustrates three pairs of alternatives; each pair includes the versions of
purchasing on credit and without credit. If the additional status good is purchased on
credit, the consumer achieves a higher overall utility level when 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 1.
However, from 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 2 to the end of the considered period, purchasing the additional status
good without credit provides a higher overall utility in each and every period.
Consequently, the overall utility on the date of purchasing is higher if the individual
finances the status good with credit. Purchasing on credit is more advantageous than
buying without credit even for a very impatient individual. This can explain why credit is
popular in the case of purchasing valuable and durable status goods among people who
cannot afford to pay for the desired goods.
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Figure 5: Comparing purchasing additional status goods with or without credit
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3.5 Discussion
Even though O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) incorporate parameter 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 into the
consumer utility function which reflects time-inconsistent preferences, they do not
consider the various degrees of impatience explicitly. Moreover, they do not link the
different levels of impatience to economic and social circumstances, neither do they
compare them. My analysis fills the gap. In the case of present-biased preferences, the
more impatient the individual is, that is, the greater his desire to get a certain good as soon
as possible, ceteris paribus, the lower the consumer utility level. This is due to the lower
value of 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽.

By applying Frijters’ (1998) interpretation about the prestige value of goods and
taking into consideration that status goods reflect their owner’s social position (Rausher,
1993) and that their consumption is an everlasting form of rivalry (Trigg, 2001), the model
assumes that a consumer possesses not only one but more status goods at the same time.
The results suggest that in the long run, it is more advantageous for a consumer to own
status goods in different stages of their lifecycles and gain intermediate prestige value from
them than to possess such status goods which are in the similar stages of the diffusion
process. In other words, a consumer can realise a higher utility level if he strives to sustain
the average prestige value of the possessed status goods around the intermediate level.
The added value of the model is that it considers how the various levels of
impatience can relate to the purchasing context, the status value of the goods and the
rivalry for social status. A very impatient individual who purchases a status good at the
beginning of its lifecycle and with a high prestige value on credit can realise a higher
utility level in the long run than a less impatient person who buys the status good in its
maturity stage. Thus, it is understandable why new status goods are purchased on credit
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and why the maturity stage of the lifecycle is not waited for. These results complete the
relations described by Frijters (1998).
Various alternatives can provide a similar overall utility level directly after
purchasing the additional status good due to trade-offs. However, over time the overall
utility of the alternatives decreases differently because of various lifecycles and diffusion
rates of the goods and the various levels of impatience. Thus, it is worth prospecting
future utility levels, especially in the long run. This is valid both for purchasing on or
without credit.
The findings explain why credit is popular among consumers who cannot afford
to pay for the wanted status goods. The reason is that the overall utility on the date of
purchasing is higher if the individual finances the goods with credit. At the same time,
taking a credit reflects the individual’s impatience, as he does not want to wait for
collecting enough money to pay for the desired goods.
Overall, as figures also indicate, a person’s social status can be enhanced only
temporarily and not permanently by purchasing only one status good. This finding is in
accordance with both Scitovsky’s (1976) logic as well as my argumentation described in
the literature review section.
The limitation of the analysis is that it takes into account only a few variations of
the stock of the already owned status goods, some diffusion rates and one form of loan
recovery. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on the level and the change of consumer
utility derived from purchasing and owning status goods in various circumstances but
eliminates the level of disposable income the consumer can spend on status and other
goods.

4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Status-seeking behaviour is a relevant and never-ending phenomenon in
developed economies. Its main form is the consumption of status goods. As people tend to
overspend on status goods to sustain or enhance their social status, indebtedness and a
decreasing saving rate can be the consequences. Furthermore, interpersonal effects,
individuals’ relative position and the prestige value of status goods have a considerable
role in consumer decision making. Due to this, it is important to investigate how the
purchasing and the possessing of status goods influence the consumer’s utility level.
The presented model reflects the dynamics of the consumption of status goods
from the perspective of consumer utility. The core of the model lies in how the level and
the change of the prestige value of status goods affect the consumer’s utility level over
time. The added value of the model is that it takes into account that present-biased
preferences can be valid during the consumption of status goods, as individuals are often
impatient to achieve a higher social position. Furthermore, a novelty of the model is that it
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also includes that the prestige value of status goods changes during their diffusion and that
people have different status properties when they purchase an additional status good to
sustain or enhance their social status. A core point is the form of financing the additional
status good; two alternatives are considered, purchasing on or without credit.
According to the findings, the more impatient a consumer is, the lower his utility
level is. However, impatience can be transformed into an advantage in the long run. For
example, a very impatient individual who purchases a status good at the beginning of its
lifecycle (with a high prestige value) on credit can realise a higher utility level than a less
impatient consumer who adopts the status good later. The findings also verify the
advantage of credit in the case of buying new status goods as the overall utility on the date
of purchasing is higher if the consumer finances the good with credit. The results suggest
that the social position can increase only temporarily by getting a status good. However,
owning several status goods which are in different stages of their lifecycles and together
provide an intermediate prestige value can be advantageous for the consumer in the long
run. It is also the novelty of the model that relations mentioned above can be described.
According to the comparison of the alternatives of consuming status goods, it
can be seen how the various alternatives are related to each other regarding the overall
consumer utility, considering the influencing factors and the passing of time. The main
conclusion is that diverse alternatives can provide the same or a similar level of the overall
utility directly after purchasing the additional status good without credit, due to the tradeoffs among influencing factors, however, the overall utility of the alternatives decreases
variously in the latter periods because of the different lifecycles and diffusion rates of the
goods and the various degrees of present-biased preferences. Furthermore, due to the
trade-offs, an alternative that yields a relatively low overall utility level in the first periods
can provide one of the highest levels at the end of the considered period.
The model that is based on the overall consumer utility levels per period can be
applied to forecast or monitor a proposed or an already realised purchase of an additional
status good. In addition, it is advantageous to compare various consumption alternatives
including the different levels of influencing factors to predict and manage the utility levels
over the considered time period. It can also be beneficial to plan or forecast an intended
purchase of a status good by taking into account the individual’s financial position to
avoid consumer’s or household’s indebtedness and to find the optimal form of financing a
valuable and durable status good for an individual.
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